Israel’s response to the Hamas terror attacks on Oct. 7, 2023, has fundamentally altered the Middle East balance of power in a way not seen since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. It is time to acknowledge that Israel now looks like the region’s hegemon.
Enabled by the United States, its Arab treaty partners and key Gulf States, the Israelis have broken the Hamas-Hezbollah ring of opposition and revealed the vulnerability and weakness of their patron in Tehran while also degrading Iran’s air defenses and missile production. Israel has expanded its occupation of Syrian territory, taken control of areas of Lebanon just north of its border and undertaken aggressive tactics in the West Bank not seen since the second intifada, which ended 20 years ago.
Israel has benefited from the weakness of surrounding states, much as Iran did while it was, until very recently, vying to be the top dog. Lebanese leaders remain preoccupied by internal rivalries while Syria’s new government faces enormous economic, political and security challenges. Despite its oil, Iraq can’t meet the needs of a large population as it struggles to balance the demands of its two masters in Washington and Tehran.
The Trump administration, assuming it still considers peace between Israel and the Palestinians a top priority, will find it harder than ever to persuade Israel to convert its newfound military dominance into enduring political agreements with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors. There are no deals on the cheap here, to be scribbled on the back of cocktail napkins. President Trump and his team will need to put in the time and effort and press key Arab states and the Palestinians to do their part and, in an even tougher task, push Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel to make concessions. Mr. Netanyahu’s recent visit to Washington suggests that Mr. Trump isn’t yet ready to try.
The Israeli leader and his far-right coalition are disinclined to strike deals, especially given that the Trump administration has imposed few constraints on Israel’s actions in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon or Syria. Mr. Netanyahu is facing trial on various charges for which he can escape judgment only by remaining in office. He is not going to jeopardize his hold on power.
That means in Israel there’s little significant domestic pressure to change course. Israel’s renewed offensive in Gaza failed to galvanize the political left even though most Israelis say they want the cease-fire to continue. Meanwhile, the groundwork for annexing much of the West Bank is rapidly advancing. Rarely have the prospects for any negotiations toward a two-state solution been more remote.
In Gaza, any talks about a sensible day-after strategy as mapped out by former Secretary of State Antony Blinken to foster security, effective governance and reconstruction look increasingly unlikely as the fighting continues. It is true that Israel cannot kill Hamas as an idea. But it can make it less relevant by offering an alternative. Mr. Netanyahu, anxious to avoid alienating right-wing members of his government, has taken the only plausible alternative off the board by rejecting a role for the Palestinian Authority and reoccupying large parts of Gaza.
And other than the president’s talk of turning Gaza into a riviera, the Trump administration has shown no interest in its postwar fate.
In Lebanon, prospects for America to be able to make a meaningful contribution to regional peace look somewhat brighter. Israel’s evisceration of Hezbollah, the resulting cease-fire and formation of a technocratic government in Beirut and the demarcation of Lebanese-Israeli maritime boundaries have prepared the ground for border negotiations and the buildup of the Lebanese Armed Forces in the contested south. These are two projects the Trump administration can take on that would have practical, lasting value. A more robust Lebanese Army capable of controlling southern Lebanon and preventing the return of Hezbollah will make the cease-fire more durable. That in turn will make an agreement on borders — and tacit Lebanese recognition of Israel — a real possibility.
Syria is a tougher problem. Mr. Trump doesn’t seem to care about developments there and has dismissed it as a mess. The question for Washington is whether a unified Syria run by an effective government is better for American interests (countering ISIS; disposing of chemical weapons) than a Syria divided territorially and permeated by foreign forces with conflicting agendas. The United States values stability because it lowers the odds of intervention and is better for Syrians; Israel, however, favors a weak and divided Syria. It has already begun building military bases there. The administration should urge Israel to work with Damascus to meet Israel’s security concerns so that the Israel forces can pull back.
Most crucially, the administration needs to investigate Iran’s willingness to sign a deal that would prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for the foreseeable future. A deal would likely not be as good as the 2015 agreement that Mr. Trump tore up, since Iran has made strides in enriching uranium to near weapons grade. But it could increase the time it would take Iran to produce a weapon by removing existing stockpiles of enriched uranium and intrusive monitoring mechanisms. Standing in the way are Mr. Netanyahu’s incessant push for military action and Mr. Trump’s own impulsiveness and impatience. The talks with Iran, which began Saturday, offer a glimmer of hope.
These diplomatic efforts by Washington could be reinforced by a push for a three-way agreement between Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United States, consisting of the normalization of Saudi-Israeli ties, a limited U.S. security guarantee for Riyadh and an American-built and managed facility so the kingdom can enrich its own uranium with minimal risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. In exchange, the Saudis would block a Chinese military toehold in the Gulf and press Israel, which wants a treaty with Saudi Arabia, to demonstrate flexibility on eventual Palestinian independence and Gaza reconstruction. Such results would be a major accomplishment.
On Sunday, U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright said that Saudi Arabia and the United States had made progress toward an agreement on helping Riyadh develop a “commercial nuclear power industry” that could not be converted to military use.
Perhaps more than any other president in the last 50 years, Mr. Trump inherits opportunities in a Middle East region where, more often than not, U.S. ideas on war and peacemaking have gone to die. But exploiting these opportunities will require qualities Mr. Trump seems to lack — focus, persistence and a willingness to push all sides hard, particularly Mr. Netanyahu.
Israel’s form of hegemony has engendered a temporary stability. But it won’t last without converting Israel’s military dominance into arrangements and agreements with its Palestinian and Arab neighbors that reflect a balance of interest rather than the current asymmetry of power, which sooner or later will lead to more confrontation, violence and terror.
Aaron David Miller, a former State Department Middle East analyst and negotiator, is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of “The End of Greatness: Why America Can’t Have (and Doesn’t Want) Another Great President.” Steven Simon teaches at Dartmouth and held senior positions in the State Department and at the National Security Council. He is the author of “Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East.”
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Bluesky, WhatsApp and Threads.
#Opinion #Israeli #Dominance #Mideast #DealMaking #Harder
